SQL Injection in GEO my WP Plugin Query Parameters

The GEO my WP plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to SQL Injection via the 'swlatlng' and 'nelatlng' parameters in all versions up to, and including, 4.5.5 The parameters are read from $_SERVER['QUERY_STRING'] via parse_str() (bypassing WordPress's wp_magic_quotes protection, which only covers $_POST/$_GET/$_COOKIE/$_REQUEST), then each is split on ',' via explode() and the resulting fragments are interpolated directly into a SQL BETWEEN clause in gmw_get_locations_within_boundaries_sql() without is_numeric() validation, (float) casting, esc_sql(), or $wpdb->prepare(). This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to append additional SQL queries into already existing queries that can be used to extract sensitive information from the database. Exploitation requires the site to host the Posts Locator search-results shortcode (`[gmw form="results" form_id=N]`) on a public page and to have at least one published post with an associated gmw_location row.

Casky was already ahead

This CVE exploits attack patterns that Casky's 301matched skills already investigate — long before this vulnerability was disclosed. Claude's reasoning model maps these techniques to MITRE ATT&CK, so practitioners who ran these skills have already seen the threat behaviour in their findings.

Analysis

The GEO my WP WordPress plugin contains a critical SQL injection vulnerability in versions up to 4.5.5, exploitable through the 'swlatlng' and 'nelatlng' parameters. The flaw stems from unsafe parameter handling: these values are extracted directly from $_SERVER['QUERY_STRING'] using parse_str(), bypassing WordPress's built-in magic_quotes protection which only covers $_POST, $_GET, $_COOKIE, and $_REQUEST superglobals. The unsanitized parameters are then split via explode() and interpolated directly into SQL BETWEEN clauses without prepared statements or escaping, allowing attackers to inject arbitrary SQL commands. This affects any WordPress installation running the vulnerable plugin, potentially exposing sensitive location data, user information, and enabling complete database compromise.

Casky's 301 mapped security skills leverage Claude's extended reasoning to identify this attack pattern across two critical MITRE ATT&CK techniques: TA0001 (Initial Access) and TA0043 (Reconnaissance). Practitioners using Casky would observe detection patterns flagging unsafe parameter sourcing from $_SERVER globals, particularly when combined with dangerous functions like parse_str() and explode() feeding into SQL query construction. The platform's skill set would highlight the absence of parameterized queries (prepared statements) and WordPress sanitization functions (wp_prepare(), esc_sql()), along with suspicious BETWEEN clause construction. Findings would specifically correlate direct SQL interpolation with QUERY_STRING sourcing—a classic injection signature—enabling teams to prioritize remediation of this input validation failure before exploitation occurs.

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EPSS Probability

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Shodan Exposure

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GreyNoise Signal

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301 Casky skills cover this attack pattern

These skills use Claude AI's reasoning model to surface findings in the same attack categories as CVE-2026-9757.

analyzing-apt-group-with-mitre-navigator

threat intelligence · low

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analyzing-campaign-attribution-evidence

threat intelligence · low

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analyzing-certificate-transparency-for-phishing

threat intelligence · low

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MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

TA0001 TA0043

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Casky has 301 skills that investigate the attack patterns behind CVE-2026-9757. Run one and get CVSS-scored findings in 3 minutes.

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