DNS Rebinding Bypasses SSRF Protection in PraisonAI

PraisonAI before 1.6.78 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability in the web_crawl tool that validates hostnames at check time but re-resolves them at connection time without IP pinning. Attackers can use DNS rebinding to bypass SSRF protection and retrieve internal HTTP response bodies from private or loopback services.

Casky was already ahead

This CVE exploits attack patterns that Casky's 331matched skills already investigate — long before this vulnerability was disclosed. Claude's reasoning model maps these techniques to MITRE ATT&CK, so practitioners who ran these skills have already seen the threat behaviour in their findings.

Analysis

PraisonAI versions before 1.6.78 contain a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in the web_crawl tool that exploits a critical timing gap in security validation. While the tool validates hostnames when checks occur, it re-resolves them at connection time without implementing IP pinning—a technique that locks a hostname to its initially-resolved IP address. This allows attackers to perform DNS rebinding attacks: they control a domain, pass initial validation as an external hostname, then change the DNS record to point to internal services (127.0.0.1, 169.254.169.254, or private ranges) before the actual connection. The vulnerability affects any organization running PraisonAI-dependent applications that crawl untrusted URLs, potentially exposing sensitive data from internal HTTP endpoints, metadata services, or localhost debugging interfaces.

Casky's 754 security skills—powered by Claude AI with extended reasoning—detect the attack patterns mapped to MITRE ATT&CK techniques TA0001 (Reconnaissance) and TA0006 (Credential Access). Practitioners using Casky would observe findings identifying: (1) suspicious DNS resolution patterns where the same hostname resolves to different IPs across sequential requests, indicating rebinding attempts; (2) HTTP requests to RFC 1918 private ranges or loopback addresses originating from web_crawl functions, flagging internal service access; (3) timing deltas between hostname validation logs and actual connection attempts that exceed normal latency, revealing the rebinding window. The platform's extended reasoning capabilities would correlate these signals—hostname validation passing but connection reaching 127.0.0.1, metadata service probing, or internal service enumeration—to surface SSRF exploitation with high confidence, enabling rapid response before sensitive data exfiltration occurs.

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Casky Risk Score

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EPSS Probability

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Shodan Exposure

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GreyNoise Signal

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Composite risk scoring from EPSS, CISA KEV, Shodan, and GreyNoise — 21 security APIs correlated into a single Casky Risk Score. Coming in Casky Pro. Join early access →

331 Casky skills cover this attack pattern

These skills use Claude AI's reasoning model to surface findings in the same attack categories as CVE-2026-61430.

Abuse of Public-Facing API: Mobile API Abuse

mobile security · low

Run

abusing-dpapi-for-credential-access

red teaming · high

Run

abusing-shadow-credentials-for-privesc

red teaming · high

Run

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

TA0001 TA0006

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