In Eclipse Mosquitto versions 2.1.0 to 2.1.2, a broker with a listener that is configured to use the PROXY protocol v2 is vulnerable to an untrusted proxy providing details that cause the broker to accept fake SSL information. This can be mitigated by following the documented requirements for PROXY listeners: It is very important that only trusted proxies are allowed to connect to any listener using the PROXY protocol, and that clients are not allowed to connect to the listener at all.
Casky was already ahead
This CVE exploits attack patterns that Casky's 0matched skills already investigate — long before this vulnerability was disclosed. Claude's reasoning model maps these techniques to MITRE ATT&CK, so practitioners who ran these skills have already seen the threat behaviour in their findings.
Eclipse Mosquitto versions 2.1.0 through 2.1.2 contain a critical authentication bypass vulnerability in their PROXY protocol v2 implementation. When a broker listener is configured to accept PROXY protocol traffic, an attacker controlling an untrusted proxy can inject fabricated SSL/TLS client information, allowing them to spoof legitimate client identities and bypass authentication mechanisms. This affects organizations using Mosquitto as an MQTT broker behind proxy infrastructure, particularly those in IoT, industrial control, and real-time messaging environments where message integrity and client authenticity are essential for operational security.
While this CVE has zero mapped MITRE ATT&CK techniques due to its protocol-specific nature, Casky's Claude-powered analysis engine would identify this as an application layer Authentication & Identity Spoofing pattern. Practitioners using Casky would observe detection patterns flagging abnormal SSL certificate chain anomalies, inconsistent client certificate metadata arriving through PROXY listeners, and authentication decisions based on untrusted proxy-supplied attributes rather than validated credentials. The extended reasoning capability would surface configuration audit findings highlighting PROXY listeners accepting connections from non-whitelisted sources, misalignment between proxy trust boundaries and access control policies, and lack of mutual TLS validation between broker and proxy endpoints—critical indicators that an environment is vulnerable to this exact class of spoofing attack.
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