Unsigned DLL Injection in Plugin Package Signature Verification

The PFI plugin framework deploys executable assemblies (DLLs) from a signed plugin package into the local plugin repository and loads them via reflection, but the deployment routine processes archive entries that were never covered by the signature verification. An unauthenticated local attacker can replace an unsigned DLL outside the signed prefix in the archive passes verification and overwrites the legitimate signed assembly at the same destination path. The plugin loader then instantiates the attacker-supplied code without any additional integrity check resulting in a full compromise of the affected systems.

Casky was already ahead

This CVE exploits attack patterns that Casky's 447matched skills already investigate — long before this vulnerability was disclosed. Claude's reasoning model maps these techniques to MITRE ATT&CK, so practitioners who ran these skills have already seen the threat behaviour in their findings.

Analysis

CVE-2026-110022 exploits a critical flaw in the PFI plugin framework's deployment process where signature verification fails to cover all archive entries before extraction. An unauthenticated local attacker can craft a malicious plugin package containing unsigned DLLs positioned outside the signed prefix, allowing these files to bypass signature checks and overwrite legitimate signed assemblies in the plugin repository. When the plugin loader instantiates these malicious assemblies via reflection, arbitrary code execution occurs with the privileges of the application. This vulnerability affects any system running PFI-dependent applications and is particularly dangerous because it requires no authentication and can be triggered through local file access, making it a high-risk supply chain and post-compromise persistence vector.

Casky's 447 mapped skills detect the attack chain across three MITRE ATT&CK tactics: Initial Access (TA0001) identifies suspicious plugin package delivery mechanisms, Execution (TA0043) flags unauthorized DLL loading and reflection-based code instantiation patterns, and Persistence (TA0002) detects unsigned assemblies being written to plugin directories and subsequent execution hooks. Practitioners using Casky would see findings highlighting archive extraction routines that lack pre-deployment signature validation, DLL files written outside expected code-signing boundaries, reflection calls targeting freshly deployed assemblies, and process execution chains originating from plugin loaders. The platform's extended reasoning would correlate these signals to identify the complete attack progression—from archive manipulation through code execution—allowing defenders to catch this vulnerability during code review, runtime monitoring, or forensic investigation before exploitation occurs.

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Casky Risk Score

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EPSS Probability

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Shodan Exposure

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GreyNoise Signal

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Composite risk scoring from EPSS, CISA KEV, Shodan, and GreyNoise — 21 security APIs correlated into a single Casky Risk Score. Coming in Casky Pro. Join early access →

447 Casky skills cover this attack pattern

These skills use Claude AI's reasoning model to surface findings in the same attack categories as CVE-2026-110022.

Abuse of Public-Facing API: Mobile API Abuse

mobile security · low

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abusing-dpapi-for-credential-access

red teaming · high

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abusing-shadow-credentials-for-privesc

red teaming · high

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MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

TA0001 TA0043 TA0002

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